It’s About Making Babies!

As much as we liken the Kennedy administration to a ‘golden age’ in American history, there were a few changes that were made that plague us today.

During WWII and before, defense contractors would communicate with the battle forces, figure something that would help, and build one or two. Tweak it, ask the Navy department to take a look. Take an order. If the Navy wanted a bunch, great. If they wanted to pass, likely they ordered enough to cover the expense of developing the demo.

In 1960, Robert McNamara entered the Kennedy administration. A bean counter. A bean counter is a swear word to most of the US military. Bean counting is a process similar to auditing finances, only you count how much each item costs, and demand what it’s value is when you use it. Sometimes this process can improve something, like figuring how to score more hits with an improved bomb sight. But McNamara was a financial wizard, and imposed what has become today Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) or something like that.

Today a contractor must finish the design, and prove the design, on paper, against specifications that the Govt. develops. Or the government first contracts out to get contractors to write the specs, then DC determines which specs to use, then contracts to begin development. On paper the process opens up competition, manages cost over-runs. In reality this big-business approach absolutely stifles any hint of true innovation. Build into the process is a three (3) year timeline. While working on a government project I was told that then development ‘process’ 2167a was intended, as a minimum, to take longer than three (3) years, so the O-6 offficer in charge at the start of the project would be rotated off before the project either succeeded or failed. No officer wants to be labeled with a failed procurement, especially when the cause of failure is usually caused by the procurement process, or correcting mistakes is prevented by the government process.

Wired.com has an article today, about the MRAP (Mine Resistance Ambush Protected) vehicles developed in SC, requested in February 2005, and actually ordered in November 2006. Vehicles intended to replace the HumVees where some 1300 of the 3700 casualties in Iraq occurred. Would all of these lives been saved with the new vehicles? Who knows? But the MRAP has tested much more survivable than the present vehicles in use.

Which brings us back to McNamara. And what I feel is an unfair slight taken at the Marine Corps, and the Department of Defense. Look at the November 2006 order date. Notice anything interesting? Like, maybe it is about the time the defense budget is passed (supposedly by the October 1 start of the fiscal year). Like, maybe February 2005 was too late for the next budget process?

When the pre-McNamara defense procurement process worked, it was a really effective way to get new weapon systems deployed and improved. It also locked in sales to the big boys of the game. At worst we had torpedoes with an appalling habit of exploding too close to the launching vessel, of misfiring, and of losing guidance, at least early in the war. We brought in improved types of aircraft in vast numbers and radically new designs at a staggering pace, and that won the ward.

It might not be completely bizarre to suggest we lost Vietnam, and have struggled so badly in Iraq, in large part due to the difficulty of today’s procurement process.

This is something Congress can fix. And since McNamara’s stint on Kennedy’s cabinet was the start of this bureaucratic boondoggle, perhaps President Bush can also fix that broken nightmare. I won’t hold my breath, though, since there have been years of law suits, court battles, and Congressional budget wrangling over details of today’s process. Meaningful reform such as changing from FAR for defense procurement to telling the Secretary of Defense ‘Do Good Work’ seems unlikely.